to be free from punishment (including humiliation) before conviction. Unless handcuffing all arrestees regardless of the circumstances serves a legitimate law enforcement purpose, such a treatment constitutes a form of punishment that undermines the presumption of innocence. 22 The connotation of guilt associated with wearing handcuffs is undeniable. Judges have long acknowledged it. 23 But it is only in court that suspects have the right to be clothed with the "appearance, dignity, and self-respect" of free and innocent individuals. 24 Most handcuffing claims against police officers are excessive force claims brought under the Fourth Amendment. 25 Despite the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Graham v. Connor 26 that the use of force be "objectively reasonable" 27 in light of the circumstances, courts have increasingly sanctioned a blanket policy of handcuffing all arrestees based on "anything is possible." 28 Failing to acknowledge that some circumstances do not warrant any use of force, courts have developed an odd injurybased jurisprudence that has made it almost impossible for handcuffed arrestees to prevail on their excessive force claims unless they can allege "severe physical injuries" resulting from the use of handcuffs. 29 Some courts have questioned the practice of handcuffing all arrestees, 30 but they have fallen short of recognizing that arrestees have a constitutional right not to be handcuffed. A recent en banc ruling by the Ninth Circuit 31 might affect how courts decide handcuffing cases, at least as it relates to the handcuffing of children. The Supreme Court has yet to formally decide the issue
Handcuffing all arrestees regardless of the circumstances for ease of police work is fundamentally inconsistent with Graham's command that any use of force be "objectively reasonable". Handcuffing, in and of itself, constitutes excessive force where the circumstances do not warrant any use of force and should be ruled unconstitutional.
The common law tradition established the right not to be handcuffed upon arrest. U.S. courts initially applied this principle through the mid-twentieth century and then erroneously abandoned it. Current handcuffing jurisprudence is thus unsound and should return to a standard that prohibits handcuffing arrestees, absent special circumstances. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. 26 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) . 27 Id. at 397. 28 See infra Part II.B. 29 See infra note 195. 30 See infra note 193. 31 See infra note 198.
I. The Common Law Right Not to Be Handcuffed Upon Arrest
Historically, the handcuffing of compliant arrestees had been considered such a "grievous indignity" 32 that common law judges did not hesitate to condemn police officers who abused their handcuffing power. Such an abuse violated the principle that presumptively innocent arrestees cannot be treated harshly absent special circumstances.
A. An Officer Cannot Handcuff a Compliant Arrestee
When the Fourth Amendment was adopted, there is some indication that police officers used handcuffs only as a last resort, 33 though there is nothing conclusive to support this assertion. 34 Little is learned from the great common law commentators, as they focused on the fettering of unconvicted prisoners in jail, at arraignment, or during trial, not at the time of arrest.
35
When Justice John Bayley of the Court of King's Bench condemned in 1825 the handcuffing of a suspected felon on the ground that there was no evidence that "it was necessary [to prevent his escape], or that he had attempted to escape," This conclusion stems from an examination of cases tried at the Old Bailey in the City of London in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. See, e.g., Old Bailey Proceedings Online (www.oldbaileyonline.org), June 28, 1769, trial of Thomas Meller for rape (t17690628-8) ("The constable said, the prisoner must have his hands tied, he having made a resistance. He was very obstropulous."); June 9, 1772, trial of James Morgan, Henry Edwards, and John Falmy for theft (t17720109-62) ("He was very resolute; we were obliged to handcuff him."); Jan. 13, 1773, trial of Barnard Kilroy for theft (t17730113-24) ("I seized him; he attempted to get away, and behaved so ill I was obliged to handcuff him."); Apr. 4, 1779, trial of Richard Hyde for breaking the peace (t17800628-111) ("When he was brought to me; he did a great deal of mischief; we were obliged to handcuff him."); July 9, 1800, trial of James Riley for theft (t18000709-93) ("[H]e was very restive going along, I was obliged to handcuff him."); Oct. 31, 1810, trial of William Trueman and Joseph Holbrook for theft and robbery (t18101031-25) ("I told the prisoner if he would go quietly I would neither tie him nor handcuff him.").
34
Other cases tried at the Old Bailey in the same period reveal that some prisoners were immediately handcuffed upon arrest. See, e.g., Dec. 6, 1769, trial of Joseph Brown for theft (t17691206-20) ("We tied his hands with the cord, and took him to the watch-house."); June 25, 1788, trial of John Place and Francis Harris for theft with violence (t17880625-14) ("I told him I wanted him, he said what for; I told him for a robbery; I tied his hands….").
35
2 BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 385 (1968) (1268) ("When the person thus arrested is to be brought before the justices he ought not to be brought with his hands tied (though sometimes in leg-irons because of the danger of escape) lest he may seem constrained to submit to any form of trial."); 2 MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 219 (1736) ("The prisoner, tho under an indictment of the highest crime, must be brought to the bar without irons, and all manners of shackles or bonds … unless there be a danger of escape."); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 297 (1769) ("But this imprisonment, as has been said, is only for safe custody, and not for punishment: therefore, in this dubious interval between the commitment and trial, a prisoner ought to be used with the utmost humanity; and neither be loaded with needless fetters, or subjected to other hardships than such as are absolutely requisite for the purpose of confinement only…."). context of a warrantless arrest, the principle laid down in Wright v. Court would soon spread to the apprehension of suspects under a warrant. 37 The law was consistent: absent special circumstances, an officer had no right to handcuff a person in custody, especially when the offense was trivial, and doing so rendered the officer liable for assault. judges consistently reminded officers that a proper arrest did not necessarily warrant the use of handcuffs and that even though probable cause existed for the arrest, they had no right to handcuff unconvicted prisoners unless it was necessary. "The police are apt to imagine that a prisoner in custody loses all his rights as a citizen" 50 complained one judge. Judges regularly stressed there was no "greater mistake" 51 than to suppose that the police could handcuff anyone they pleased and that handcuffing everyone upon arrest amounted to "treat all alike," justified the use of handcuffs even though the alleged offense was minor.
70
Courts cautioned against defining "with over-minute exactness" 71 when handcuffs could be used, being mindful not to unreasonably interfere with the discretion of the police, 72 while insisting on their role as protector of the liberty of the subject.
73
The abuse of the use of handcuffs was real and it was for the courts to guard against the tendency of the police to automatically handcuff arrestees. The handcuffing of women, elders, and infirm persons was particularly reproved. ) ("The sergeant's explanation for the use of handcuffs was simply that it was normal procedure, and he did not apply his mind to the particular circumstances. The handcuffing was not justifiable and amounted to an assault and battery for which the plaintiff was entitled to compensation."); Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration, [1980] 3 S.C.C. 526 (India) ("Handcuffing is prima facie inhuman and, therefore, unreasonable….
[H]andcuffs must be the last refuge, not the routine regimen.").
principle, the police must use only such force as is reasonable in the circumstances." 76 In London, the Metropolitan Police Force is required, as in the past, 77 to justify the use of handcuffs.
78
This contrasts significantly with the widespread handcuffing of arrestees in the United States.
79

II. A Disappearing Right in the United States
Through the mid-twentieth century, U.S. law recognized a standard similar to the one adopted in other common law jurisdictions: even though the police had probable cause to arrest, they could still be liable for unnecessarily handcuffing arrestees. This police accountability would vanish as the use of handcuffs by officers became routine and the judiciary largely abdicated its role as guardian of civil liberties.
A. Probable Cause Was Not Enough to Justify Handcuffing Arrestees
Even though manual touching is unnecessary to constitute an arrest, 80 U.S. courts recognized early that the act of tying the hands of prisoners was within the authority of police officers.
81
Officers had the duty to safely bring their prisoners before a magistrate when they reasonably could, 82 and allowing an escape could expose them to liability. 83 But ministers of the law abused their authority when they treated arrestees with unnecessary harshness. persons are assumed to be innocent until proven guilty in the manner provided," 85 stressed the training inspector at the New York Police Department in the early 1900s. As a result, the manner in which arrests were conducted was particularly scrutinized.
Thus a New York newspaper article, "Constable Charged With Brutality. Manacles Prisoner's Hands Behind His Back" 86 exemplified the law in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: an officer was not justified in handcuffing an arrestee unless the circumstances dictated otherwise. 87 Several factors were considered in assessing whether the handcuffing was reasonable: the seriousness of the offence, the demeanor and build of the suspect, the time and place of arrest, whether resistance was offered, and whether the officer honestly believed that the suspect posed a threat or was likely to escape. Thus an unresisting debtor quietly submitting to the authority of a sheriff could not be loaded with bonds and fetters, 88 or a citizen handcuffed for not leaving promptly after voting and for taunting a policeman absent a showing he was quarrelsome, dangerous, or desperate, or intended to commit a breach of the peace. 89 As for a man charged with criminal libel and offering no resistance, nothing could justify handcuffing him and leading him through the streets of a city in broad daylight, especially when the sole purpose was to punish and humiliate him. here may be cases in which an officer would have a right to place handcuffs upon a prisoner, but from the allegations in the petition in this case it is made to appear that the acts complained of were done maliciously, unnecessarily, and for the purpose of degrading and punishing the appellant, and not for the purpose of enabling the officer to properly execute the writ then in his hands."). 
98
One court gave further discretion to the police, though it stands alone in its broad holding until well into the twentieth century. In Firestone v. Rice, 99 the Supreme Court of Michigan held that a certain discretion must be given to the officer and absent recklessness, wantonness, or malice, an officer may lawfully handcuff a prisoner if he has "good reason" 100 to do so, even if it turns out that the suspect was innocent, harmless, and had no intention of escaping.
101
Yet there were special circumstances in this case. The court upheld the handcuffing of suspected felons known to be "slippery and desperate" 102 and conveyed through the woods on a dark night and at a late hour for a great distance. Firestone was paradoxically interpreted as giving broad discretion to the police 103 despite the court's own acknowledgement that handcuffing was an "extreme measure" 104 used under certain circumstances. In 1934 and again in 1965, the Restatement of Torts still stated the common law rule that an officer may not handcuff a suspect without "reasonable ground," 105 and stressed that custodial power could not be used in a manner "grossly offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity….".
106
In the 1940s, Professor Rollin Perkins, a national authority on criminal law, taught his students that using handcuffs depended on the circumstances; therefore "an officer would be acting unlawfully if he should handcuff one arrested on a minor traffic charge if there was no resistance and no other reason to believe handcuffing necessary." 
99
Firestone v. Rice, 71 Mich. 377, 384-385 (1888) (holding that "[i]t is not necessary … that the prisoner must be unruly, or attempt to escape, before he can be handcuffed, or do anything indicating a necessity for such restraint. Nor, in the event that he does nothing, at the time of the arrest, in the way of attempting to escape, or resisting the officer, is it necessary that he should be a notoriously bad character in order to justify the tying of his hands. There may be other and sufficient reasons … why such extreme measures should be resorted to in order to secure and safely lodge the prisoner."). 100 Id.
101
Id. at 386. See also Chrisman v. Carney, 33 Ark. 316 (1878) (holding that handcuffing does not transcend the power of the officer when done with a view to security).
102
Firestone, 71 Mich. at 385.
103
Handcuffing of Prisoners -Discretion of Officers, 3 N.Y. Op. Att'y Gen. 424 (1930) ("It seems that an officer is entitled to use his judgment as to the handcuffing of a prisoner, and that while he will be liable for a malicious and wanton abuse of such discretion, there will ordinarily be a strong presumption that he has acted reasonably and honestly."). In all of these cases, the officers were still expected to justify the use of handcuffs, and judges held accountable those who abused their discretion. This longstanding common law would soon be replaced by routine, unquestioned handcuffing.
B. A Stunning Reversal: Probable Cause Arrest Renders Handcuffing Per Se Reasonable
By the 1970s, routine handcuffing was well underway in the United States, as handcuffs became an integral part of police uniform.
110
Complaints against their unvarying use rose.
111
Citizens denounced the unnecessary handcuffing of nonthreatening arrestees.
112
In 1975, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, an influential law enforcement lobbying organization founded in Chicago in 1893, recommended that all arrestees be handcuffed. 113 In stark contrast, the Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland maintains to this day the traditional view that using handcuffs is unlawful unless it can be justified.
114
One 1976 case would significantly, but mistakenly, influence the development of modern handcuffing jurisprudence. In Bur v. Gilbert, 115 a decision involving the handcuffing at his office of a man charged with a traffic offense, a federal district court ruled that "mere handcuffing, without more, cannot form the basis of a complaint under §1983", Id.
120
Id.
121
[their] wrists" 122 could they now expect to prevail in court. The court held that because the "use of such minimal force is not uncommon or unusual in the course of an arrest," 123 as "many, if not most arrests are bound to involve some touching of the person," 124 and because the initial arrest was made under due process, 125 the "secondary effects of the use of minimal force incident to that arrest is not violative" 126 of due process. The court thus sanctioned routine handcuffing regardless of the circumstances surrounding the arrest, de facto abrogating a more than a century-old common law rule.
Other (2014) (noting that "the most common form of injury is superficial radial neuropathy, which may clear up in a week or two but the effects of which can take up to three years to disappear.").
123
Bur, 415 F. Supp. at 341. 124 Id.
125
Id. at 342. Bur predates Graham v. Connor, a U.S. Supreme Court decision holding that excessive force claims "are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's 'objective reasonableness' standard, rather than under a substantive due process standard." 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). 126 
Id.
127
See, e.g., Healy v. City of Brentwood, 649 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Mo. App. 1983) ("Police officers face serious risks every time they carry out an arrest. Sometimes the most inoffensive appearing individuals turn out to be uncharacteristically violent. A police officer who is proceeding to convey any prisoner to a police headquarters in a police vehicle should not be faced with a civil law suit because he takes the precaution to handcuff the prisoner to prevent her from causing trouble on the way to headquarters."); Franklin v. City of Boise, 806 F. Supp. 879, 890 (D. Idaho 1992) ("It is undisputed that such a custodial arrest puts the officer's safety at risk; are we to remove both the officer's discretion and the one procedure that would protect him, simply because the arrestee 'appears' passive and was arrested for a minor crime? There is no law, rule, or city policy that dictates such a result. The hope was short-lived. The court granted qualified immunity to the officers on the ground there was "still no clear authority on whether and under what circumstances, if any, a person has a constitutional right not to be handcuffed in the course of an arrest." 135 Officers had carte blanche to handcuff at will, and handcuff they did, with the blessing of the courts. Id. at 355. Gail Atwater was taken to the local police station, where she had to remove her shoes, jewelry, and eyeglasses, and empty her pockets. Her "mug shot" was taken and she was placed alone, in a jail cell for about one hour. Id. station, 144 a case affirmed on appeal by Judge John Roberts, the future Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.
145
At the same time, it was reported that officers in Texas had handcuffed and taken to jail a ninety-seven-year-old woman for not paying a traffic ticket.
146
"Standard procedure" was their answer. 147 Most courts have not since disagreed.
148
III. For a Return to Reasonableness: No Handcuffing of Arrestees Absent Special Circumstances
In response to the handcuffing of arrestees, judges apply selective case memory rather than follow long-standing common law principles.
149
This has resulted in a profound divide between members of the judiciary and common citizens, who witness in disbelief the disappearance of their right to be treated with dignity upon arrest.
150
The U.S. Supreme Court in Atwater cited numerous precedents, legal treatises, and statutes, some dating back to the thirteenth century, to answer whether the Fourth Amendment forbade a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense. ut it has no application to a determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial has even begun."). Contra R.I. CONST. art. I, § 14 ("Every man being presumed innocent, until he is pronounced guilty by the law, no act of severity which is not necessary to secure an accused person, shall be permitted."); OR. CONST. art. XV, § 10(2). The majority cited Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996) (Scalia, J.), as the controlling precedent: "Where probable cause has existed, the only cases in which we have found it necessary actually to perform the 'balancing' analysis involved searches or seizures conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to an individual's privacy or even physical interests." not made in such an "extraordinary manner" as to violate the Fourth Amendment. the logical and legal conclusion would be that handcuffing a four-year-old child is not so "extraordinary" as to violate the Fourth Amendment. Such a result would run afoul of common sense and common law.
"What about deterrence?" asked Justice Scalia during oral argument in Atwater. "Don't you think people are going to be pretty unlikely to eat french fries on the subway in Washington. … And maybe in Lago Vista, not to belt up their kids? … Well is that worth nothing?" 165 Atwater's counsel quickly (and correctly) replied that it was "confusing punishment with enforcement" 166 and that a police officer may 154 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354. Id. at 396. 158 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 373 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 159 Atwater, 523 U.S. at 350. not punish an alleged offender, 167 such power being vested in the judiciary only. 168 The Supreme Court itself recognized that deterrence was one of the "traditional aims of punishment." 169 Despite acknowledging that "the physical incidents of arrest were merely gratuitous humiliations imposed by a police officer who was (at best) exercising extremely poor judgment" 170 and that Atwater suffered "pointless indignity," 171 the Court nevertheless dismissed her claim. It could have ruled, as these common law courts did, that the unnecessary handcuffing of a woman in public is a "shocking humiliation," 172 or that the unreasonable handcuffing of a compliant arrestee is an "indignity," 173 or that "handcuffing is an act against all norms of decency." 174 Being led away in handcuffs is a demeaning and humiliating experience, 175 even more so when the suspect ends up being cleared of all charges.
There is widespread indignation over the needless handcuffing of compliant arrestees. 176 The use of handcuffs by the police is "one of the most frequent and repeated citizen complaints" 177 noted a public safety auditor. "Outraged," Because presumptively innocent arrestees must be treated in accord with their status, it is unlawful for police officers to subject arrestees to "any more restraint than 167 is necessary," 180 or to use "unnecessary or unreasonable force" 181 in making the arrest, or to "abuse" 182 or treat arrestees with "unnecessary rigor." 183 The fact that officers have probable cause to arrest does not exempt them from treating arrestees properly, 184 a traditional mandate of the law of arrest. 185 The U.S. Department of Justice itself has concluded that "[l]aw enforcement agencies must recognize and respect the value and dignity of every person." 186 Probable cause is not a license to strip presumptively innocent arrestees of their dignity.
Citing Graham, 187 many courts have justified the use of handcuffs on compliant arrestees on the ground that "the right to make an arrest … necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion." 188 In doing so, they conveniently rewrote the law of arrest by omitting one important point: an arrest does not necessarily involve an actual restraint of the person, but may be effected by the submission to the custody of an officer, a time-honored common law principle 189 reiterated by Graham itself, which refers to the "right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof" 190 to effect the arrest. It is worth repeating: a proper arrest does not necessarily warrant the use of handcuffs and holding otherwise is an incorrect reading of the law. 191 In Soares, the Second Circuit rejected defendant's invitation to adopt a per se rule that handcuffing arrestees is always reasonable, "[g]iven Graham's teaching that each case be decided on its own facts." but they overwhelmingly grant qualified immunity to the officers, as did the court in Soares, on the ground that it is not clearly established that handcuffing per se could be unconstitutional. 194 Most courts today require evidence of severe physical injury caused by the handcuffs to establish excessive force. 195 This injury-based jurisprudence should be abandoned. It pre-dates Graham and is inconsistent with its "objectively reasonable" standard.
The Ninth Circuit has recently abandoned it, and other courts, including the Supreme Court, should follow this return to a reasonableness standard. The case involved a sixth-grader with attention-deficit and hyperactivity disorder who refused to leave the school playground and was taken into temporary custody 196 by the police. Vindicating the district judge's astute observation that "[e]ven minor uses of force may be unreasonable where the circumstances do not warrant any use of force," 197 the Court ruled that the "use of handcuffs on a calm, compliant, but nonresponsive 11-year-old child was unreasonable," 198 and denied qualified immunity to the officers on the ground that "none of the Graham factors even remotely justified keeping C.B. handcuffed for approximately thirty minutes in the back seat of a safety-locked vehicle." 199 "'Anything is possible' is not a sufficient basis to handcuff a child who poses no likely threat of any kind" 200 added the Court. The Court offered a textbook application of Graham: the 80 pounds, 4'8" tall sixth-grader had committed no crime, was not an immediate threat to the officers or to others, and did not resist or attempt to escape; therefore the handcuffing was unreasonable. The ruling is significant for at least two reasons. First, it departs from other circuits holding that handcuffing is per se reasonable absent evidence of injury. policies providing that the intent is not "to create an atmosphere that in order to avoid risk, a deputy should handcuff all persons regardless of the circumstances." 212 As intimated by Graham, police officers should point to specific, articulable facts that justify handcuffing arrestees, and "the need for handcuffing and the threat to officer safety must not be imagined or objectively unreasonable under the particular circumstances." 213 An arrest for a minor offense would weigh against the reasonableness of using handcuffs, absent special circumstances. 214 Four years after Atwater, Justice Kennedy wrote in Muehler v. Mena, a case upholding the handcuffing of a suspect at her home during a search for weapons and a wanted gang member, that "the use of handcuffs is the use of force, and such force must be objectively reasonable under the circumstances." 215 Absent any factual basis that a person arrested for a minor offense poses an immediate threat to the officers or to others, or resists, or attempts to escape, the handcuffing incident to arrest must be ruled illegal, notwithstanding that the arrest itself is constitutional or that the handcuffs do not cause any injury. Any other ruling is a denial of justice.
Conclusion
Since the nineteenth century, the common law has consistently held that arrestees cannot be handcuffed absent special circumstances, acknowledging that presumptively innocent arrestees must be treated in accord with their status. Even though a certain degree of discretion was given to the officers, common law courts never sanctioned the unvarying use of handcuffs on all arrestees regardless of the circumstances.
U.S. courts embraced a similar principle until at least the middle of the twentieth century. But as officers began to routinely handcuff arrestees, the courts lost their way, concerned that recognizing a right to be free from handcuffs upon arrest would impede the work of the police and increase litigation.
Police officers have largely been given carte blanche to handcuff arrestees. Not surprisingly, the number of persons handcuffed has increased dramatically. No one is immune from being handcuffed, not even children or elders arrested for the most trivial offenses.
This must change. Courts must draw the line on handcuffing, particularly when arrestees are compliant or of extreme ages. The Ninth Circuit has begun the return to a reasonable standard by holding that handcuffing a compliant sixth-grader violates the Fourth Amendment. Other courts, including the Supreme Court, must now acknowledge that the use of handcuffs in some arrest situations is simply not warranted. 212 See, e.g., SONOMA COUNTY SHERIFF'S HANDCUFF POLICY §354.2. 
